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ABSTRACT 
 
Economic, political, and social tendencies have brought new actors into the picture. Alliances, 
business networks, and a special type of cooperation called “cluster” now play a more and more 
important role in the development of countries’ economies and in the enhancement of regions’ and 
local companies’ competitiveness. The most efficient of these are clusters, which consist of profit 
oriented, competitive companies, academic institutions, and civil establishments trying to collaborate 
with each other toward a common goal and taking advantages of geographical proximity and the 
coordination of capacities. The most essential condition for establishment of a cluster is that a 
certain number of enterprises take part in the collaboration. This number can be defined as 
“critical mass,” because it generates processes that attract other institutions to the region to utilize 
the possibilities of spatial concentration and to take advantage of positive local conditions. The 
specific quantity of institutions in “critical mass” is related to the financial requirements of the 
given cluster. Reciprocal access to the organizations' incomes is necessary to long-term operation, 
and this can be difficult without the right number and combination of members. I created an 
economic-mathematical model suitable for examination of networks’ sustainability, considering 
financial circumstances and shareholder base. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
My paper is about a mathematical-economic model I have created for the 
examination of the sustainability of business networks as clusters.  
Today's economic map of the world is characterized by what Porter calls 
clusters: critical masses in one place made of linked industries and institutions 
ranging from suppliers through universities to government agencies that enjoy 
unusual competitive success in a particular field (Porter, 1998). 
Clusters have been explored by several authors dating back to Weber (1929) and 
Marshall (1920, 1923). More recent reviews include those of Lloyd and Dicken 
(1977), Krugman (1991) and Enright (1998) but the most quoted explanation was 
identified by Porter (1998). 
According to Porter’s theory clusters are geographic concentrations of 
interconnected companies, specialized suppliers, service providers, and associated 
institutions in a particular field that are present in a nation or region. Clusters affect 
competition in three broad ways: first, by increasing the productivity of companies 
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based in the area; second, by setting the direction and pace of innovation; and third, 
by stimulating the formation of new businesses within the cluster. Geographic, 
cultural, and institutional proximity provides companies with special access, closer 
relationships, better information, powerful incentives, and other advantages that are 
difficult to tap from a distance (Porter, 1998). 
The maintenance of these initiations is a popular topic of discussions among the 
specialists and the policy makers everywhere in the world and that was the reason 
why I have dealt with the modelling of this problem.  
If we examine the countries where cluster policies have been determined and 
applied we can experience that there is no generally accepted practice which can be 
used successfully everywhere and could be adopted without difficulties by other 
countries. This is due to the divided opinions on the maintenance, membership and 
financing of clusters depending on the national capabilities, special circumstances 
and economic backgrounds. The participants of collaboration require external 
support either from the government or the EU especially in the first phase of the 
cooperation. The network needs a significant amount of investment in order to 
create a favourable business environment and overcome problems related to the 
difficulties of communication and the lack of trust. In addition the invested capital 
does not generate profit and quick return automatically. However policy makers 
emphasize the importance of clusters’ self-sustaining capacity which is essential to 
the long-term sustainability of networks. This capacity can only be realized in the 
end of the second or at the beginning of the third phase of the life-cycle. 
Summarizing the requirements joint funding seems to be the best solution. 
Experiences highlight the fact that exclusive state aids result in the formation of 
clusters where no real cooperation exists but which were established only for the 
acquisition of EU sources. The financial question is strongly associated with the 
membership composition of these organizations. The number of contributors 
operating in the same industrial branch, such as enterprises, support and 
background institutions, has to reach a minimum. This so-called ’critical mass’ is 
necessary to realize the self-financing of clusters and generate positive processes 
attracting other institutions to take advantage of local externalities and geographical 
proximity thus enhancing the area’s competitiveness. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
More experts have examined the dynamics and the “critical mass” of clusters with 
mathematical tools who had a very great impact on me and on my research activity. 
I emphasize among them Brenner (2004) and his book titled „Local Industrial 
Clusters, Existence, Emergence and Evolution” and the book „Clusters, Networks 
and Innovation” which was edited by Breschi and Malerba (2006). In addition to these 
the basic idea of my mathematical-economic model was inspired by a biological 
model examining the sustainability of a community consisting of two homogeneous 
groups with different functions, tasks and responsibilities. This article was written 
by three American researchers called Haque, Egerstedt and Martin (2010). The lion 
model they created dealt with African Lions, Panthera leo that live in well-defined 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 3 Suppl 1 
 179
social structures known as prides. Typically, these prides consist of 1-3 adult males 
and 2-9 adult females along with their dependent cubs. Females are usually in 
charge of hunting for food, while males are responsible for territorial defense. The 
American research team determined whether the group is sustainable with a given 
number of males and females. By sustainable, they meant that the females can hunt 
sufficient prey to feed the entire pride and at the same time, there is an adequate 
number of males to patrol the territory. 
I applied the same method because I divided the cluster initiation into two 
homogenous groups consisting of productive and improductive members where 
both of these teams had their own tasks. I tried to transpose the criteria of the lion 
model into mine making some adjustments on the way.  
 
CLUSTER-MODEL 
 
Meanings of the abbreviations and notations 
The abbreviation C arises from the English expression „cluster” which is a special 
type of business network. I divided the cluster’s membership into two groups. 
These consist of J productive and improductive members. 
It is self-evident that the members count for different advantages and benefits 
from the co-operation, that is the reason why they choose to collaborate against the 
intense competition. I assumed that all of these gains can be realized in money. M is 
the cluster’s resource demand, mJ stands for the aim for money of productive 
members, mI means the expectation for sources of improductive members which 
are determined for one year. 
The measure of annual membership fee which has to be paid into the cluster’s 
budget by the members is t, where the subscripts refer to the groups which they 
belong to. Accordingly tJ marks the annual membership fee of productive members 
while tI shows the annual membership fee of improductive members. 
A special part of incomes within the cluster arises from external services which 
are provided for outsiders by productive members therefore I marked it with sJ. 
Pr is the abbreviation of a bivariate function which describes the probability of 
applications’ chances of winning. These applications were submitted by groups 
formed ad hoc within the cluster to apply for money from the European Union and 
from the Hungarian government.  
The parameter g illustrates the number of project teams created within the 
cluster to submit applications and raise fund. Let me assume that all of them 
include jg productive and ig improductive cluster members. 
I would like to emphasize that the same (optimal) productive-improductive 
proportion can be experienced in all groups of a cluster which have been formed to 
submit applications and it is valid in the whole network too. I marked this rate with k. 
 
THE CLUSTER MODEL’S ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The membership of the cluster consists of two groups. One of them involves 
productive members like enterprises, suppliers and service providers while the 
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other involves improductive members such as universities, research institutes, 
consulting companies and other non-profit organizations. This condition can be 
described with the following equation: 
 C=I+J. (1) 
The long-term operation and the sustainability of the cluster require a minimum 
level of annual sources necessary to finance the operating expenses and to facilitate 
the provision of services for the cluster’s members (for example to maintain the 
common webpage, organize different trainings, professional tours and factory 
visits, edit and send out the annual newsletter and a lot of advertisements, represent 
the cluster’s members at conferences, workshops and exhibitions, obtain money for 
the maintenance of the cluster’s management organization etc.). Members’ aim for 
money can be evaluated with the following formula: 
 ( ) JmImJIM JI ⋅+⋅=,min . (2) 
The money flowing into the cluster within a year is utilized jointly by the partaking 
members of the co-operation to realize their common goals. Therefore when I 
simulated the model I assumed that the share from the network’s money is the 
same for the productive and for the improductive members. That was the reason 
why I substituted the same amount into. This amount can be defined as one 
member’s need who decided to participate in the collaboration to complete its 
missing capacities. This money should be realized from the annual sources by each 
organization regardless of its being productive or improductive. Concerning the 
amount we can differenciate it between the two groups. If the contribution of the 
productive members to the cluster’s maintenance is more important than that of 
the improductive one, we can allocate a bigger amount for the improductive 
members which means that mJ> mI. 
1. The annual revenue of the cluster can derive from membership fees, from 
external services and from winning projects which can be realized in one year as the 
following equation shows: 
 ( ) ( )ggJJI ijMgJsJtItJIM ,Pr, ⋅⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅= , (3) 
where M  signs the amount of the average annual money acquired by the applying 
groups formed ad hoc while Pr(jg, ig) shows the probability which describes 
applications’ chance of winning.  
2. Pr(jg, ig)∈[0,1] gives a probability whose value can move between 0 and 1 and it 
is described by a bivariate quadratic performance curve. One of the possible 
functions can be written down by the following equation:   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )220220
1,Pr
kyxeyykkyx
yx −+−⋅+−
= , (4) 
and another condition is valid at the same time: 00 kyx = . This curve reflects the 5th 
hypothesis very well. The applications’ chances of winning are higher if the groups 
formed to write proposals consist of more productive and improductive members 
till they reach the upper limit of the membership. After that the coordination and 
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the harmonization of the members’ interests become more difficult and the 
efficiency decreases. The highest chance of winning can be experienced in the 
environment of the x=ky line, and Pr(x, y) function’s absolute maximum is in the  
(x0, y0) point. The figure of the curve can be followed up at the first illustration 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 
 
The probability distribution function 
 
 
 
3. Each group within the cluster formed to apply for governmental support has to 
include productive and improductive members. Let me repeat the former remark 
that the same (optimal) productive-improductive proportion can be experienced in 
all groups and is valid in the whole network too. This rate was marked with k. 
I assume that every member of the cluster is allowed to take part in a maximum 
of one application (and since participation in projects is not obligatory there can be 
passive members in the cluster). This assumption can be described with the 
following formulas: 
 Jjg g ≤⋅ , (5) 
 Iig g ≤⋅ , (6) 
 
g
g
i
j
I
Jk == . (7) 
4. According to my notion of sustainability, a cluster can be maintained in the long 
term if it’s financially feasible without any problems which means that the following 
condition prevails: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )ggIIJJJ ijMgtmIstmJ ,Pr⋅⋅≤−⋅+−−⋅ . (8) 
Lukács: Economic-Mathematical Model for the Examination of Clusters’ Sustainability 
 182
5. My model has an additional component because it is based on the West-
Transdanubian Region and I assumed that the membership of the cluster does not 
cross the imaginary borders. Seven statistical regions were adopted in Hungary by 
the decision of the Parliament in 1998. The Region of West-Pannonia includes 
three counties: Győr-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala counties. The region borders 
four countries: Austria in the West, Slovenia and Croatia in the Southwest and 
Slovakia in the North. I utilized the information about the Region’s area because its 
extension is 11 209km2. I experienced that the improductive members of the 
clusters such as universities, research institutes, the Regional Development 
Agency’s offices and the largest consulting and tender writer companies 
concentrate in the 3 counties’ centres: Győr, Szombathely and Zalaegerszeg and in 
a big town called Sopron. I considered 4 cities as improductive centres where 
unknown numbers of improductive organizations can be found facilitating the 
productive members’ more effective operations. 
I illustrated the four towns with their geographic coordinates and I fitted a circle 
around them with the Ordinary Least Squares as you can see in the Figure 2. After 
that the circle which I got was increased to the size of the region’s extension, to 
11 209km2.  
The circle which I fitted around the region’s 4 big towns (improductive centres), 
Sopron, Győr, Szombathely and Zalaegerszeg can be seen in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 
 
The circle fitted around Győr, Sopron, Szombathely and Zalaegerszeg 
(improductive centres) 
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SIMULATION AND RESULTS 
 
I tried to provide the computerized testing of the model with actual data from the 
real economic environment. In this intention I could count on managers directing 
the clusters’ operation in the West-Pannon Region. A chosen cluster supplied the 
information used in the model to simulate its function.  
In the first case I tested the members of the chosen cluster pay an annual fee to 
facilitate long term operation and financial security. The amount of this fee is tJ = 
100 for the productive members and tI = 50 for the improductive ones. (The 
amounts are given in thousand forints abbreviated HUF.)  
The optimal productive-improductive proportion in the cluster and in all of the 
groups formed within the cluster was assumed as 2 which means that k=2. 
The cluster has other incomes too which arise from external services. These are 
provided for outsiders by productive members. I evaluated the amount of the 
annual service charge and determined its measure in sJ = 67 (thousand HUF).  
I assumed that 3 groups formed within the cluster to write applications and to try 
to get money for the co-operation in the framework of the cluster. It means that 
g=3. I had another assumption for the composition of proposal writer groups too 
because I assumed that all groups consist of 5 productive and 2 improductive 
members: jg=5 és ig=2. 
The members share the sources realized in one year equally because they utilize the 
money jointly. I assumed that the average annual resource demand of improductive and 
productive members is the same. This amount is mJ = mI= 500 (thousand HUF). 
The question is given: Which clusters are sustainable in long term under these 
conditions if the network’s composition and membership is taken into account?  
The answer which I got from the simulation is illustrated in the Figure 3.  
The three cases differ from each other only in one condition, every other 
parameter is the same. The amount of money acquired by winning tenders is 
decreased gradually. The result can be followed up in the Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3 
 
The result of the model’s first simulation 
 
1. case M = 50 000 000 HUF/year  
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2. case M = 35 000 000 HUF/year  
 
case M = 30 000 000 HUF/year  
  
 
In the first case I assumed that the groups writing proposals could acquire 50 
million HUF as support from the Hungarian government and from the European 
Union. I examined the conditions which influence the cluster’s sustainability and I 
determined that under the given circumstances 60 different networks of different 
sizes and shareholder basis are viable. The solution can be represented by a triangle 
bounded by 3 lines arising from the equations in the 5th and 6th points. When I 
reduced the external sources I experienced the decrease of the number of 
sustainable clusters. When the amount of support was 35 million HUF, the line 
representing the financial criteria changed and therefore the area of the triangle 
(solution of the mathematical exercise) became smaller and it resulted less clusters 
that can be maintained in long term. Only 2 clusters can operate under these 
circumstances. In the third case the assumed external contribution to the cluster’s 
budget was 30 million HUF. When I left all the other conditions unchanged I 
experienced that there was no co-operation in the framework of clusters that could 
be maintained in long term.  
During the first simulation I became curious wheatear the number of the 
sustainable cluster initations will change and the chance of survival will be higher or 
not if I increase both the amounts of  annual fees for the productive and 
improductive members too at the same time when the external sources are reduced. 
This situation means that the contribution of the collaboration’s members lifts 
while the proportion of the supports which clusters get by applications from the 
Regional and Business Studies Vol 3 Suppl 1 
 185
government decreases within the financial structure of the cluster. I simulated this 
case and I represented the result on the Figure 4. 
I substituted the same data I had used in the first simulation before I started to 
decrease the external sources of the cluster but in the second testing I reduced the 
governmental support and increased the annual fees of productive and 
improductive members parallel. This solution is promoted by most of the experts 
dealing with the financial maintenance of clusters because they emphasize the 
importance of the organizations’ self-preservation which is essential to the long-
term operation. I assumed the same measurement (20 percent) in the reduction of 
the governmental support and in the increase which happened in the amounts of 
the annual fees. It means that 3 parameters changed parallel in the model: M which 
signes the amount of the average annual money acquired by the winning 
applications decreases by 20 percent year by year while tJ  and tI  (the annual 
membership fees of the productive and improductive members) increase by 20 
percent every year. Every other data is unchanged compared to the initial state.  
The result of the simulation can be studied in the Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 
 
The result of the model’s second simulation 
 
1. case  M = 50 000 000 HUF/year, tJ = 100 000 and tI = 50 000 HUF/year 
  
2. case M = 40 000 000 HUF/year (-20 percent), tJ = 120 000 and tI = 60 000 
HUF/year (+20 percent) 
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3. case M = 32 000 000 HUF/year (-20 percent), tJ = 144 000 and tI = 72 000 
HUF/year (+20 percent) 
  
4. case M = 25 600 000 HUF/year (-20 percent), tJ = 172 800 and tI = 86 400 
HUF/year (+20 percent) 
 
 
In the first case when the data were the same as in the initial state of the first 
simulation the result was the same because 60 different networks with different 
sizes and shareholder basis were viable. One year later the governmental support 
decreased by 20 percent and the external sources represented such a big proportion 
in the financial structure of the cluster that the reduction of them could not be 
compensated by the increase of the annual membership fees (which is a typical 
characteristic of the Hungarian cluster initiations) the number of the sustainable 
clusters fell down and only 19 clusters stayed in the examination which have a good 
chance to the long-term operation among the given circumstances. I repeated the 
same changes in the following two years too but the number of the sustainable 
clusters decreased year by year. The conclusion of the second simulation is that 
without a balanced financial structure - where the external sources do not represent 
an extremely big proportion in the financial structure like in Hungary - it can not be 
realized that the decreasing governmental sources can be substituted by the increase 
of the participants’ contribution and by the growing membership fees. Cluster 
initiations in Hungary depend on external sources too much therefore they need to 
be promoted by the government especially in the first some years of their 
operation. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
My goal was to create a simple mathematical-economic model which is suitable to 
examine clusters’ and other business networks’ chance of survival under different 
circumstances. I wanted to take the financial conditions into account just as much 
as the shareholder base. I am aware of the fact that my model has a lot of 
deficiencies because of the simplifications and it needs to be improved, and I am 
planning to develop it in the future.   
However it can be determined from this model that clusters need to collect 
membership fees in addition to gathering external sources and support from the 
government. The consequence that the size of networks cannot be increased 
flippantly can also be instructive. If the sources acquired from applications decrease 
they can be substituted with the increase of membership fees and service charges 
which can jeopardize the co-operation and the survival of the cluster should its 
members refuse payment. 
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